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The Limits of the Wahlverwandtschaft
Images of Germany in the Main Swedish
Conservative Organs 1945-48
Johan Östling
Zusammenfassung
Die Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Deutschland haben eine sehr
wechselhafte Geschichte. In den Jahren zwischen der Reichsgründung 1871
und dem Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs 1914 gab es in Schweden mehr
deutschfreundlich gesinnte Schweden als jemals zuvor, aber in der
Zwischenkriegszeit nahm ihre Zahl kontinuierlich ab. Am längsten erhielt sich
diese Wahlfreundschaft in konservativen Kreisen, auch wenn diese
Sichtweise auf Deutschland nach 1933 immer weniger opportun wurde.
Aufgrund dieser Perspektive wird in diesem Aufsatz untersucht, wie sich das
Deutschlandbild in den konservativen Leitorganen der Nachkriegszeit 1945
bis 1948 entwickelte. Ergebnis ist, dass der Nationalsozialismus scharf
verurteilt wurde, in den konservativen Stimmen aber nicht – wie früher
behauptet worden war – das deutsche Volk für schuldig befunden wurde.
Sicherlich bedeutete die Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg eine neue Phase
in den deutsch-schwedischen Kontakten – aber ein totaler Bruch in den
Beziehungen kann nicht belegt werden.
Johan Östling ist Student der Geschichte und Ideengeschichte an der
Universität Uppsala.
Introduction1
On May 7th and 9th 1945, the unconditional surrender of the German Reich
was signed. The Nazi millennium had ceased to exist. In the devastated
Germany Stunde Null began.
The Allies divided the country into occupation zones. A kind of restoration
began, materially as well as morally. However, the human suffering
remained. “Re-education” and “denazification” would vouch for a democratic
and safe Europe. Instead, Germany became the first battlefield of the Cold
War.
These events were thoroughly analysed in Sweden, whose relations with
Germany had been full of changes through history. Since the 1870s, the
united Germany had been the dominating cultural, economical, and military
power on the Continent. In Sweden, Germanophiles could be found in
different political and ideological groups. During the interwar period, and in
particular after 1933, the number of Germanophiles was heavily reduced.
This affinity survived longest in conservative circles, where Germanophiles
could be found even after the outbreak of the Second World War.
This paper will therefore focus on attitudes towards Germany in the main
organs for the conservative Swedish opinion 1945–48. What did they write
NORDEUROPAforum
Zeitschrift für Politik,
Wirtschaft und Kultur
ISSN 1863639X
1/2001
11. Jahrgang (4. der N.F.)
Seiten 3-25
Textanfang
Zusammenfassung
Introduction
Method
Sources and Literature
The State of the Art
Background and context
The Swedes and Germany
Conservatism and National Soci
Images of Germany
General Characterization
The Question of Guilt
The Historical Germany
The Future Germany
Results and Conclusions
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Johan Östling
about? What did they think about Germany's future and the war guilt? Could
Goethe and Schiller still be read or were their names forever dragged into
the dirt?
The German history gives the chronological limits; hence the study covers
the time from Stunde Null to the Berlin blockade. After that, the classic
phase of the Cold War began and other questions came up for discussion.
Method
The method is above all qualitative. Fundamentals concerning the articles, for
example the number that was published a specific year, are noted, but the
textual interpretation is much more important.2 The analysed articles have
been divided into three categories according to their content. These
categories, which correspond to three parts of the empirical examination,
can be described through questions:
The question of guilt. Who or what had caused the war? Did they
separate Nazis
from Germans? What did they think about the collective guilt?
A. 
The historical Germany. How was the classical German culture
valued? Could a historical continuity be traced between the Third
Reich and earlier phases of German history?
B. 
The future Germany. In what light was Germany’s future seen? What
kind of attitudes existed towards the occupation powers? Which
questions did the Cold War raise?
C. 
This categorization is not the only possible one. For example, questions
concerning the war guilt were often discussed in connection with German
history. This is, however, one way to categorize the material, and certainly a
way that gives us a fair and true picture of the subject.
Sources and Literature
The source material consists of 73 articles from the newspaper Svenska
Dagbladet (SvD) 1945–48 and 20 articles from the periodical Svensk
Tidskrift (SvT) from the same period.
The selection of publications must be explained. The purpose is to examine
attitudes in the main conservative organs. Therefore, Svenska Dagbladet is
especially appropriate, since it was the leading conservative newspaper in
Sweden at the time. During the Second World War, the newspaper had
defended the policy of neutrality and for the most part supported the
Swedish coalition government. Pro-Nazi sympathies among the writers had
been actively suppressed.3 Svensk Tidskrift was the main right-wing
periodical and was published ten times a year. Among earlier editors, Eli F.
Heckscher and Gösta Bagge are famous; the conservative political scientist
Elis Håstad was editor-in-chief 1935–48.4 During the first post-war years,
there was no major political-ideological debate in the Swedish newspapers.
The Cold War was not publicly discussed before the beginning of the 1950s.
Until the 1960s, the cultural sections of the dailies were mouthpieces of
different ideologies, but during this decade, they opened up for individual
debaters.5
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For Svenska Dagbladet’s part, the analysis includes only articles on culture
and editorials. These have been filed at “Pressarkivet” in Uppsala. I have
systematically examined the cuttings labelled “Germany.” For Svensk
Tidskrift’s part, all kinds of articles have been studied.
Among the varied literature that has been used, I can only mention a few.
The historian Anders Berge’s Det kalla kriget i Tidens spegel and the press
researcher Elisabeth Sandlund’s Svenska Dagbladets historia, del III have
been used to give a picture of the public opinion.6 The historian Alf W.
Johansson’s Den nazistiska utmaningen, the historian Jörg Lindner’s Den
svenska Tysklands-hjälpen 1945–1954, and the professor of German
Helmut Müssener’s Deutschsprachige Belletristik in schwedischer
Übersetzung 1870–1979 have been indispensable for the understanding of
changes in Swedish-German relations.7 For the same purpose, the
intellectual historian Svante Nordin’s essay Tyska utsikter 1871–1995 and
the historian Sverker Oredsson’s Lunds universitet under andra världskriget
have been read.8 The philologist Barbro Eberan’s dissertation Luther?
Friedrich „der Große“? Wagner? Nietzsche? ...?...? Wer war an Hitler
schuld? has been useful when discussing the Schuldfrage.9
T he State of the Art
Only a few comprehensive studies of the Swedish-German relations
exist.10 The anthology Schweden und Deutschland. Begegnungen und
Impulse. Tyskland och Sverige. Möten och impulser embraces thousand
years of history, but without scientific claims.11 Another important work is
Skandinavien och Tyskland 1800–1914, which includes many historical
essays but lacks penetrating analyses and syntheses.12
However, many relevant monographs have been written. Helmut Miissener
has carried out a great deal of research on the history of the Swedish-
German cultural and intellectual exchange.13 Klaus Misgeld has written
several times about the Swedish social democracy and Germany, but he has
mostly focused on realpolitik and official relations.14 The same can be said
about the historical anthology Neuanfang: Beziehungen zwischen Schweden
und Deutschland 1945–1954.15 In the essay Tyska utsikter 1871–1995,
Svante Nordin writes about the changes in the Swedish images of
Germany.16 Despite the title, he has almost nothing to say about the
post-war years. Nordin’s essay includes interesting observations, but it is
written in a popular way. In the history of Lund University 1933–45, Sverker
Oredsson gives examples of conservative, academic and Germanophile
circles.17 Alf W. Johansson astutely writes about the attitudes towards
Germany both among the leading politicians and the conservative groups
before and during the war.18
As the only work that has a direct bearing on the subject of this paper, Jörg
Lindner’s Den svenska Tysklands-hjälpens historia is of special interest.
Primarily, he concentrates on the Swedish aid contributions, but he also
examines “old and new images of Germany.” In connection to this, Lindner
has analysed Svensk tidskrift (1945–54) to show how Germany was seen
by the Swedish Right. However, this is almost a digression in his dissertation
and the result is presented only on a few pages.19
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Background and context
The Swedes and Germany
The geographical factor has meant that the Swedish history always has
been interspersed with German elements. Since prehistoric times, however,
the relations between the two countries have been full of changes;
dissension and disunity have been turned into military alliances and
Wahlverwandtschaft, missions and war have been followed by trading and
intellectual exchange.
It is impossible to depict the complete history of the Swedish images of
Germany. This sketch will instead focus on the years from Bismarck’s
unification of the German Empire to the end of the Second World War and
will primarily concentrate on the cultural and ideological connections.20
The German Empire was founded in 1871 and became the dominating
power on the Continent. At the same time, the Swedish public opinion
changed; the Francophile and Scandinavistic currents weakened sharply
while the pro-German ones were strengthened. This was officially confirmed
in 1872, when Oscar II succeeded his brother Charles XV on the throne.21
The period from the Reichsgründung to the outbreak of the Great War was
the golden age of the Swedish Germanophiles. It is, however, important to
stress that these sympathies could be found among all strata of society,
even if the grounds for the Germanophile leanings differed. For the
conservatives – who traditionally represented the classical Germanophiles –
the appeal was in the discipline, the military strength, and the cultural
superiority. But also radicals and socialists could see Germany as the
leading progressive country. Here they could not only find the mother party of
all social democrats, but also important pioneers of theory and agitation.
Scientists and industrialists did the same as erudite scholars and artists –
they all gravitated towards the powerful southern neighbour.22 Other aspects
that should not be underestimated, are knowledge of the language, military
connections, and personal relations.23 Directed against those who want to
equate conservatism with Germanophilia, Svante Nordin calls our attention to
the Swedish radical leftist and pan-Germanist Bengt Lidforss, who at the
beginning of the twentieth century emphatically demanded that Sweden
should apply for membership in the German Empire.24
In this respect, the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 must be
seen as a dividing line. Among Swedish conservatives, the great majority
probably sided with the Central Powers. Germany was seen as guarantee
for social order and as a bulwark against Russian barbarism and subversive
radicalism. In the periodical Svensk Lösen, edited by Sven Lidman, the
pro-German activism found its forum. The phrase “the ideas of 1914,” which
was formulated by the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, expressed the
necessity of order, culture, and moral at the expense of liberty, equality and
fraternity.25 While the rightists continued to be pro-German, the liberals and
socialists, whose education was as German as the conservatives’, were
forced to reconsider their convictions. Politically, these groups distanced
themselves from Germany. Instead, they resorted to the democratic stability
of Great Britain or the revolutionary Russia.26
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Until the 1933 Machtübernahme, the old order in Sweden was only partly
restored. The Anglo-Saxon influences grew stronger but in Swedish
textbooks the Germans could still be characterized as “dutiful” and
“energetic.”27 However, the harsh Treaty of Versailles converted some of
those who had taken the side of the Allies. The Scandinavians, and above all
the Swedes, got German credit for the humanitarian aid after the Great War.
Many Germans saw in the people of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII
their sister nations, whose virtues were strongly admired: bravery,
primordiality, noble-mindedness, and a true relationship to nature. The
so-called Nordische Gesellschaft which during the interwar period
propagated for the moral and spiritual superiority of the Nordic race,
certainly contributed to the spreading of this idea, the Nordische Gedanke.28
The admiration was mutual, however. In the decadent and politically unstable
Weimar Republic, both the leftist and rightist could see a forthcoming
Schlaraffenland, sometimes as a communist Soviet republic, sometimes as
a resurrected empire. Germany had, notwithstanding that, lost some of its
lustre and was unable to without hindrance attract Swedes from different
social strata. The demilitarization, democratization, and general levelling of
society evoked disgust and loathing among the Swedish admirers of imperial
Germany, such as the literary critic Fredrik Böök, the author Per Hallström,
and the explorer Sven Hedin. Nonetheless, they continued to respect
Germany.29 In Sweden there were furthermore a couple of Nazi-infected
Swedish-German societies, whose purpose was to strengthen the
connections between the two countries, for instance Svensk-tyska
föreningen and Riksföreningen Sverige-Tyskland.30
The 1920s were in other words a decade which included both fascination for
and dissociation from Germany, but for many of the intellectual groups a
strong fascination for the leading country of European modernism remained.
1933 is, however, a distinct divider in the history of the Swedish images of
Germany.31 “The dark on the horizon,” as the Swedish minister of finance
Ernst Wigforss wrote, became an important memento for the young social
democratic government to force socialistic and democratic reforms. But even
the liberals and the conservatives clearly marked their distance, the latter
when they in 1934 detached their Nazi-fraternizing youth league from the
main party.32 The picture has nevertheless some nuances. For example, the
conservative newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, due to their Communist scare,
initially proved understanding to Germany’s new leadership.33
To be German-friendly and to be Hitler-friendly increasingly became more or
less the same during the second half of the 1930s.34 Despite the strong
cultural and ideological links, there were remarkably few Swedes who
transformed their sympathy for Germany to sympathy for Hitler. In the
conservative and agrarian (Bondeförbundet) parties, a geopolitical and
historical inspired Germanophilia survived through the 1930s, but the
Kristallnacht and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact strongly weakened this
current.35 When the war broke out, only a minority rallied round the Third
Reich.36 During the war years, Alf W. Johansson wants to separate an
attitude of real-politik from an ideological attitude towards Germany. The
former, which primarily was cherished by the Right, saw Germany from its
position in the current European system of states. The latter view, which was
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emphasized by liberals and social democrats, meant that Germany should
be judged according to the moral standard of the regime.37 According to
Johansson, the politics of the Swedish coalition government became more
and more pro-Allied and pro-Norwegian after the autumn of 1941, i.e. before
the fortune of war changed.38
In a study of the University of Lund during the Second World War, Sverker
Oredsson uses other concepts than Johansson and he also reaches different
conclusions. According to him, Lund university was in the years 1940–41
very much adapted in an ideological way to the new world order. The great
majority among the leading professors and members of student’s union were
right-wingers, often with special feelings for Germany. 1942 was the year of
change and this should be understood as a direct result of the war. After this
year, the number of Germanophiles decreased drastically. This
characterization cannot, however, be generalized to the whole academic
milieu in Sweden, since there were more pro-Nazis in Lund than
elsewhere.39
The picture becomes even more complex if a study of Helmut Müssener is
included. In his examination of Swedish translations of German literature, he
concludes that the Third Reich did not mean a Kulturkatastrophe in this
respect; in some regards, the publication of translated German fiction even
increased during these years. Instead, the absolute low point was reached
1945–49, when the translation of light reading literature in particular
decreased sharply.40
On the whole, 1933 must be seen as an important divide. Social democrats,
liberals, and most of the conservatives emphatically repudiated “the new
Germany.” When the war broke out, the number of openly confessing
Germanophiles was indeed reduced, but they could still be found in certain
political, military, and academic circles. By the end of the war, pro-German
sympathies had long since ceased to be comme il faut. The German culture,
compromised and fallen into disrepute, was finally degraded when English
became the first foreign language in the Swedish schools during the second
half of the 1940s.41
Conservatism and National Socialism
Social democracy saw National Socialism as an authoritarian ideology which
tried to annihilate all democratic and genuine socialist ambitions. The Liberals
for their part reacted against the permeating racism and the disrespect for
human dignity.42
The relationship between conservatism and Nazism is more complex. There
were, as Alf W. Johansson has noted, certain features in National Socialism
which could appeal to a conservative mind: hierarchical structures and
traditional family values as well as anti-Communism and hostility towards the
Labour Movement. On the other side, the traditional conservatives took
offence at the plebian manner of National Socialism and their disregard for
the generally accepted conception of justice.43
In Sweden, this ambivalence resulted in an ideological grey zone between
conservatism and Nazism during the 1930s. In this field, older,
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anti-democratic elements, that had survived in parts of the established Right,
could flourish. The publicist Rütger Essén, who later was one of the editors
of the pro-Nazi newspaper Dagsposten, is perhaps the most renowned
representative of this tradition.44
Even in the parliamentary organized Right, which 1938 changed names to
Högerns riksorganisation, a conflict emerged between a German-inspired,
organic attitude towards the state and a more democratic, British attitude.
The latter won the day, essentially because of the repulsive examples which
were to be seen on the Continent between the two wars.45 Among the
Swedish parties in the Riksdag, the agrarian party was probably the most
inclined to incorporate National Socialist ideas.46 In addition to this, there
were of course also the Swedish Nazi parties, led by for example Birger
Furugård and Sven Olof Lindholm.47
During the first years of the Second World War, the spirit of the time was
authoritarian and nationalistic. The conservative bastions – the monarchy, the
church, and the army – were strengthened.48 By the end of the war, the
situation was quite another. The German historian Martin Broszat has
presented an interesting interpretation. According to him, the knowledge of
the Nazi barbarism had also led to the simultaneous destruction of many
traditionalistic values. Hitler destroyed, so to speak, the base for all
conservative opposition against modernity and liberal democracy.49 At any
rate, the Conservative Party received the lowest number of votes ever in the
late 1940s, while the Liberals became the largest non-Socialist party. Not
until the 1950s did the more liberal profile win acceptance. With this, the
Right was able to regain lost ground.50
Images of Germany
General Characterization
This study is based on the analysis of 93 articles. Approximately four fifths of
them, i.e. 73 articles, were published in Svenska Dagbladet; the rest are
from Svensk Tidskrift.
The daily paper Svenska Dagbladet published most articles about German
issues during the first year of the study, 1945 (28). This is not surprising,
since the dramatic end of the war, the first winter of peace, and the question
of the German war guilt were exhaustively commented upon. However, the
result for the next year is more surprising; in 1946 only 7 articles were to be
found. This can perhaps best be explained by the relative calm in top-level
politics that year; beside the Nuremberg trials, the main issue was the
destitution in post-war Germany.
The following year, in 1947, the German issues were again under discussion
(17 articles). The external explanations for the renewed interest are obvious:
the approaching Cold War. This tendency is also strong during the last year
of the study, 1948, when 21 articles were published. The gap between East
and West, illustrated in the Berlin blockade, was in focus.
For the periodical Svensk Tidskrift, the situation was partly another. During
the first two years, the publication included 8 and 5 articles, respectively, on
German matters. The war guilt and parallels between the Third Reich and
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earlier German epochs were discussed. For the following years (1947–48),
the number of articles was even lower, 2 and 5, respectively. It is to be
noted that the stress was on issues concerning guilt and historical continuity,
while the absence of the Cold War was conspicuous.
The Question of Guilt
In what follows, I will focus on the Schuldfrage. This is, in many respects, a
question of the causes of the war and the rise of National Socialism. This
was discussed extensively both in occupied Germany and in the occupying
powers during the first two years of peace, but after 1946 it lost a good deal
of its interest. The Vergangenheitsbewältigung was for two decades
overshadowed by the Zukunftsbewältigung.51
In this case, it is relevant to analyze if the articles were concerned mainly
with actors or structures. The first perspective sees changes of history as a
result of individuals or groups of individuals. The other stresses the
structures, for example social or economical conditions, in explaining history.
This division is of course artificial; in reality, the borderline cases are much
more common.
In connection with this, the concept of “Vansittartism” must also be
scrutinized. This idea, named after the British diplomat Lord Robert Gilbert
Vansittart, states that the war and Nazism could be explained only by the
craving for power which imbued the German Geist. The Germans, who were
deeply anti-democratic and militaristic, should therefore be collectively
condemned.52
A general feature in all articles is the strong and categorical condemnation of
National Socialism. The descriptions of the Third Reich and its leaders took,
with a few exceptions, the form of moral denunciations. In a few cases, the
economical and social progressiveness of Nazi Germany was pronounced,
but this meant nothing compared to the suffering of the occupied people and
the heinous treatment of Jews and political opponents.53
When it came to the issue of individual versus collective guilt, the consensus
was broken. “The Führer’s way led to destruction,” a writer concluded in
April 1945.54 The other Nazi leaders, included “the Robespierre of
Darwinism,” Himmler, were Hitler blindly devoted. In an article from the same
year, the following was said about what Hitler had done to Germany: “A
completely drained and entirely defeated nation, in a devastated and
conquered land.” He was described as a militarist in the worst sense of the
word, whose elixir of life was the brutal and nihilistic war.55
The same images reappeared several times during the first years.56 It was
Hitler himself, the embodiment of evil, who had evoked the chaos. With other
words, the attention was paid to actors and not structures.
However, this explanation was not the only one. Instead, “the Nazis,” i.e. an
ill-defined collective, were made the scapegoat. During the Nuremberg trials
of 1946, for example, the Nazi leadership was seen as the root of all evil,
while collaborators and party officials had made “the triumph and survival of
the brown plague” possible.57 In a contribution to the debate on the war
criminals, the following was stated: “Foremost among the war criminals
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stand the German leaders, the creators of the spirit from which the German
outrages have originated.”58 In another example, the blood-guilt of the
regime was mentioned. The guilt was attributed exclusively to the Nazi
leaders.59
The examples are manifold, but it suffices to draw one conclusion: the actors
could shift, but the actor perspective did not change. Sometimes the war
was seen as one man’s work, sometimes the whole movement, above all the
leaders, was blamed. In many respects, though, the actors seemed to be
interchangeable.60 The name “Hitler,” for example, was more of a symbol for
the regime than a solitary personage. “The necessary victory over Hitler,” it
was noted, “is at the same time the defeat of Germany.”61
Nonetheless, there were a few articles that viewed the problems from a
structural angle. In an article from 1945 about the democracy in the future,
the social circumstances of the interwar period explained best why many
discontented, desperate ex-soldiers became fascists.62 In a review of
Friedrich Meinecke’s Die deutsche Katastrophe, the critic Erich Wittenberg
polemized with the author. To a much greater extent than Meinecke, he
wanted to seek structural explanations. “In fact”, Wittenberg wrote, “the
explanation of this [i.e. the political success of the Nazis] is the international
world-economic crisis of 1929, which paralyzed the Germans’ resisting
power to National Socialism.”63
The advocates of Vansittarism took up an extreme attitude to the issue of
guilt. They meant that the name of the barbarism was not Nazism but
Germany. The Germans were demonized. From this point of view, the idea
of a collective guilt followed, an idea that could evolve also without a
Vansittartistic conviction.
The Vansittartistic mode of thinking was not received very well by the
conservative opinion. On a comparison with the Soviet Union, the following
was written:
But the great majority of German citizens are individually no
more criminal than their killed Russian brothers [...]. However,
the responsibility must be put on the German leadership,
which more or less willingly contributed to the rise, exercise
of power, and war crimes of National Socialism.64
In many articles, a clear distinction between the German people and the
Nazis was made. The Germans were even seen as the first victims of the
regime.65 In Germany, as the Danish historian Aage Friis noticed, there lived
millions of respectable men and women, who all had the same hatred of
Hitler as the non-German anti-Nazis.66 For those who desired a democratic
Germany, “the rabid recipe of Vansittartism” was even counter-productive:
the worse the Germans were treated, the easier the crushed ideology could
emerge again.67 Also in the more explicit discussion about the collective
guilt, for example in connection with the Nuremberg trials, the critical
contributions were in the majority. Most of the writers found it absurd –
psychologically as well as legally – to demand any kind of collective
confession of guilt.68
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However, even here there were some exceptions. Above all in Svensk
Tidskrift, proof to the contrary could be found. According to one text, it was
“the Germans as a people, not as individuals,” who were ladened with guilt.
And the explanation was quite simple: The German upbringing “had made the
Germans fundamentally different from other peoples.”69 This kind of obvious
Vansittartism was, however, unusual.
To sum up, the origin of the war was explained by referring to different
actors. Sometimes nobody but Hitler was guilty of the heinous deeds,
sometimes the whole Nazi movement was blamed. Examples of
Vansittartism in the articles were uncommon; in fact, this kind of ideas
seemed to be counter-productive for democratization and Entnazifizierung.
The concept of a collective German guilt was rejected.
The Historical Germany
The examination of the conservative ideas of the historical Germany is
divided into two parts. First, the notion of the Germans as “a people of
writers and thinkers” is brought into focus. The main questions were often
related to the value of Germany as a Kulturnation. Had the Nazi outrages
perverted and discredited the classical German culture? Was it possible to
write poetry after Auschwitz? In short, had “the other Germany” survived?
The second part focuses on continuity versus discontinuity in history. The
problem can be summarized into a question: Was the Third Reich a negation
of the Germany of Luther, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck – or its logical
completion?
In these lines the trauma was caught:
No dramatic writer could actually ever have portrayed the
contrast between the old and the new Germany, between its
good and evil genius, in a more horrifying way than the
coincidence that the prison camp of Buchenwald lay only a
couple of kilometres from Weimar. [...] Presume that all
those, who spiritually have prospered at this court of muses –
Goethe, Schiller, Wieland, Herder, and others – had become
aware of the atrocities which have taken place nearby. They
would have turned their faces away in disgust. They would
have fled their destiny of belonging to a people which was
enable to commit such systematic outrages.70
The other Germany, for which “nothing was more alien than narrow-minded
nationalism and brutality,” was now confronted with its antithesis. However,
the author of the article had hopes of a renaissance for the humanistic
virtues and exclaimed: Back to Weimar!71
Everyone was not so enthusiastic, but all contributions to this subject took
the part of the classical Germany. The essential difference between the
Third Reich and the other Germany was emphatically stressed. The Nazi era
was characterized by a return to barbarism for a civilized nation.72 Hitler was
described as “the arch-enemy of the classical German ideals and the
conservative outlook on society.”73 Friedrich Meinecke’s book about the
German catastrophe was reviewed in a feature article. The critic paid
NORDEUROPAforum
Zeitschrift für Politik,
Wirtschaft und Kultur
ISSN 1863639X
1/2001
11. Jahrgang (4. der N.F.)
Seiten 3-25
Textanfang
Zusammenfassung
Introduction
Method
Sources and Literature
The State of the Art
Background and context
The Swedes and Germany
Conservatism and National Soci
Images of Germany
General Characterization
The Question of Guilt
The Historical Germany
The Future Germany
Results and Conclusions
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Johan Östling
special attention to one of Meinecke’s theses: “Since the days of Frederick
William I and Frederick the Great, two different spirits have lived within the
Prussian state: ‘eine kulturfähige und eine kulturwidrige.’” During the 18th and
19th centuries, these forces were kept at bay. But now, in the 20th century,
the latter of them has prevailed. The outcome of this Manichaean battle will
determine the German future.74
Among those who embraced the other Germany, no dissociation from these
virtues was to be found. On the contrary, the classical ideals were still
undoubtedly desirable; to this testified many articles about celebrated men
from the past which were published 1945–48.75 Seldom, if ever, did they
discuss the problem of continuity in German history. Others, however, were
preoccupied with this question.
Both the continuities and the discontinuities were debated, but in different
manners and in different kinds of articles. Those who wanted to see 1933 as
a dividing point often took the new legal system which came into force this
year as their point of departure. “Twelve years of Nazi regime have uprooted
the [...] civil rule of law,” one writer stated.76 With similar arguments, 1933
could be seen as a moral and cultural retrogression, as an atavistic relapse
into a more primitive stage of development.77 Many of these interpretations
were, however, based on superficial analogies and never sought to
problemize. The explanation of this is probably quite simple: it was obvious
for the early post-war generation to see the discontinuities between Nazi
Germany and older German precursors, for example the Weimar Republic.
In other articles, though, more interesting and penetrating lines of argument
were followed. In the discussions of the problem of continuity in German
history, a couple of distinctive features frequently recurred: the dutifulness,
Prussian militarism, the heritage from the Bismarckian policy of expansion
and so forth. But they disagreed about the exact relationship between the
periods. The relations between the Prussian spirit and Hitlerism were
discussed in an article from 1948. A kind of congeniality was admitted, but
the connection was not simple, since characteristics of Hitlerism have,
according to the author, their roots in the nationalism of the early
19th century, which was hostile to Prussia. Hitler was seen as Bismarck’s
antipode, not as his reincarnation.78 Others, who were less balanced, could
conclude: “A very specific kind of upbringing has been fostered by the
Germans. It is called Prussian militarism.”79 In the years 1871–1918, the
writer continued, this ideal got a foothold in all German states. His conclusion
was: “National Socialism has again dressed the German ideal of upbringing
in uniform, from which it was exempted during the Republic.”80 The idea of
the Sonderweg has here an early upholder. A partly different opinion was
published two years later in Svensk Tidskrift. The demagogy Hitler, whose
essence did not include anything Prussian, had disguised “his tyrannical lust
for power and his nihilistic philosophy in the forms of [...] German patriotism.”
Finally, the author denied any spiritual relationship between Hitler on the one
hand and Frederick the Great and Bismarck on the other.81
The result is partly ambiguous. Some texts preferred isolating the Third
Reich from the rest of German history, but in most of the more ambitious
surveys similarities to other epochs were pointed out. Continuity could above
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all be seen regarding Prussianism and militarism. Notably, this argumentation
is partially inconsistent with the actor perspective. A possible solution is that
the actors, for example Hitler, were seen as extreme exponents of a specific
tradition.
The Future Germany
The attention will now be called to the future. The very precarious situation in
Germany during the first post-war years was given fairly large attention in
the conservative publications. The poverty, both materially and spiritually,
was focused on. The articles were not primarily formed as distanced
reports; on the contrary, they were passionate contributions to the debate on
Germany's future. During the first years, the social, economical, political, and
moral restoration was intensively discussed. But soon, at least from 1946,
the approaching Cold War was a major theme when the German future was
on the agenda. The attitudes to both these issues – the restoration and the
super power conflict – will now be examined.
In a pessimistic analysis of October 20 1945, the following could be read:
The news from Germany becomes more and more
unanimous in their dreary description of the consequences of
the terrible defeat. The political problems which surround
Germany’s future and the question of “the re-education” of
the Germans are more and more eclipsed by the urgent
worries for the homeless masses and their supply problems.
The outlook for the winter is dismal.82
In truth, this article was representative. Whenever the civilian population was
mentioned, the tone became gloomy and the atmosphere dark. The
smouldering ruins of today were compared with the devastation after the
Peace of Westphalia. The conclusion was depressing: No matter how
devastating the Thirty Years’ War was, the situation today was much
worse.83 It is true that the conservative organs did not have a reporter as
Stig Dagerman to send, but they nevertheless published sympathetic stories
from the demolished Germany.84
Indeed, the majority of the articles dealt with other subjects, but during the
first years the famine and poverty returned many times. To relieve the
suffering, the German economy must gain new strength. On this point all
agreed, even if some of them had their doubts about the possibilities to
succeed. The conservative opinion objected decisively to the so-called
Morgenthau Plan, whose instigator, the American Secretary of the Treasury,
Henry Morgenthau, wanted to transform Germany into a harmless,
demilitarized agrarian society through deindustrialization.85
The Swedish conservatives were of one opinion. They concluded that a
radical reawakening of the industry was needed, since “the factories now fall
into decay at the same speed as the work capacity of the people yields and
demoralization increases.”86 Morgenthau and those who shared his views
obviously thought that European peace could only be bought at the cost of
German deindustrialization. His critics, among them the Swedish rightists,
were convinced that peace could only be safeguarded if the German
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economy was rehabilitated. Destitution and human degradation were
furthermore a perfect breeding ground for revanchism and newly awakened
fascism.87 As a logical consequence of this, the Marshall Plan was received
favourably 1947, even if commentaries occurred only rarely during this
period.88 (The American reconstruction program was first realized 1948–52.)
It was, however, not only the material destitution that must be relieved. A
kind democratic “re-education” of the whole German people was also
necessary. Some of the writers spoke about a spiritual Enttrümmerung,
which above all was important for the rising generation.89 But many were
disillusioned: “The Germans are so paralyzed by all misery and so indifferent
to all politics, that at least the Anglo-Saxons doubt the possibilities to realize
the desired ‘re-education.’”90 This particular mentality – the disillusioned,
paralyzing mentality – was seen as an impediment to the Germans.91
The conservatives fulminated above all against the occupying powers. Their
inability to formulate and realize a powerful, constructive reconstruction
program was lashed. The British German-policy was mercilessly
condemned, sometimes explicit directed against Labour’s “meddlesome
planned economy.”92 But all Allies were blamed. The Western Powers were
in 1946 accused of not having a common plan for Germany’s future and their
procedures up till now had been “an amazing proof of incompetence.”93
Irresoluteness and large organizing problems had lined their way.94
The Western occupation policy was unanimously criticized during the first
two years. After that, the blame was toned down, albeit relatively. When the
Cold War went into its classic phase, the focus shifted. The American,
British, and French achievements were interpreted according to the new
political logic.
The second part in this conflict, the Soviet Union, had, however, in a different
way been closely observed since 1945. Anti-Communism had at this time a
solid position in the conservative circles, in Sweden and elsewhere.95 In
spite of anti-Communism, the Soviet German-policy was not indiscriminately
condemned by the opinion, even if distance always was kept. The Russians
– this incorrect term was used almost without exception – were for example
more successful with their aid contributions.96 To their credit, the rightists
had also to admit their ability to act.97 But apart from this, the criticism of the
Soviet policy was unsparing.
Already when the war came to an end, a flag of warning was hoisted: the
Bolshevistic manifesto was spread at the speed of light east of the
Oder-Neisse Line. Many articles entertained apprehensions that Eastern
Germany would fall under Soviet jurisdiction. The German political
indifference and many years’ experience to a dictatorial regime would make
way for “the Asiatic hordes.” The fight against Germany was over. The fight
for Germany had started.98
By and by, the criticism increased. Sometimes, the eastern occupation zone
was criticized for its lack of the legal rights of the individual.99 Sometimes,
the ruthless socializations and the collectivist land reforms were blamed.100
But also the Soviet reparations were decried, while these only had
“sabotaged every endeavour to economically reconstruct Germany.”101
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All these articles saw Germany as the first battlefield of the Cold War. The
term “the Cold War,” coined in April 1947, is almost not to be found in the
sources, but the characteristics of the conflict – the bipolar world order, the
strong ideological antagonisms, and the immediate danger of a third world
war – are clear.102 Of course, this is even more obvious during the Berlin
blockade from 1948.103
Comparing Communism with Nazism was another way of condemning the
Soviet system. Talking of “the re-education” in the eastern zone, a writer
concluded that “the conversion from brown to red goes as easy as the
opposite during Hitler’s first years.”104 Sometimes, the ideologies were more
explicitly placed on an equal level, as when a discussion about the Soviet
Union was ended with the words: “every collectivist state has the same
totalitarian claims as the Third Reich.”105 Notably, the lowest common
denominator for these comparisons was the word “totalitarian”.106
Noteworthy, great, all-embracing visions about the German future were
seldom discussed. On the agenda stood questions about French-German
co-operation and the new German constitution.107 The dreams of a united,
peaceful Europe, in which the Germans were ordinary citizens, first reached
Sweden at the end of the 1940s. But then, however, Konrad Adenauer’s,
Alcide de Gasperi’s, and Robert Schuman’s ideas were favourably received
by the Swedish conservative opinion.108
To sum up, the pessimism was overwhelming in many of the articles that
concerned Germany's future. Initially, i.e. 1945–46, the misery and the lack
of aid contributions were alarming. Later, the Cold War became the
overriding problem. The conservative opinion saw reindustrialization and
denazification as the best remedy for Germany. Indeed, all occupation
powers were criticized, but the most relentless diatribes were launched
against the Soviet Union.
Results and Conclusions
The general images of Germany in the conservative Swedish opinion has
been analyzed. It is time to relate these results to the greater whole. Were
these views representative of the whole ideological spectrum?
Anders Berge has studied the interpretations of the Cold War in the social
democratic periodical Tiden.109 According to the author, Tiden viewed
1945–47 a future co-operation between the great powers in the occupied
Germany as a possibility. On the whole, the journal was fairly positive these
years and its attitude towards the Soviet Union was less rejecting than
Svenska Dagbladet’s and Svensk Tidskrift’s. On the contrary, Tiden denied
the threat of a future Russian expansion westward. However, the periodical
changed sides by the autumn of 1947. Then, the gap between East and
West was incontestable.110
In his gradual thesis Den svenska Tysklands-hjälpen 1945–1954, Jörg
Lindner has studied different kinds of texts to find examples of images of
Germany.111 His analysis is partly unsatisfying and his selection of
periodicals seems to be arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn things
from his work. Tiden has not lost its interest in Germany after the war.
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Vansittartistic ideas seemed to have been more common than in its
conservative sister publication. On the other hand, the German working
classes had not, according to the dissertation, been attracted by the
Bismarckian ideals. Instead, the arguments for the prevalence of a German
militaristic elite are fairly common in the social democratic organ, an idea
whose counterpart is not to be found in the conservative press.112 Lindner
also examines the leading business magazines – Affärsvärlden,
Finanstidningen and Industria. In many respects, these publications took up
a pragmatic attitude, where the trade political aspects were most
important.113
In one respect, Jorg Lindner’s dissertation is especially interesting. He reads
Svensk Tidskrift, which according to him is the main organ of “a traditionally
Germanophile group.”114 His results agree partially with this paper’s. It is
more or less impossible to find traces of Vansittartism, Lindner concludes.
The Third Reich was furthermore seen as the antithesis of “the other
Germany.” This correlates with my results. On the other hand, he concludes:
“According to the Right, the Third Reich was an ahistorical parenthesis which
was the result of the Treaty of Versailles and the special socio-economic
conditions of the 1920s and 1930s.”115 This is not true. I have showed that
two disparate explanations to the rise of Nazi Germany could be found in the
sources. Neither of these corresponded with Lindner’s. First, there were
many rightists, in Svenska Dagbladet as well as in Svensk Tidskrift, who
clearly saw a historical continuity between the Third Reich and earlier
German epochs. Nobody spoke of “an ahistorical parenthesis.” Secondly,
only very few used structural explanations, as the socio-economic conditions
of the interwar period, when they tried to understand what had happened.
Hitler or the Nazi leaders were the only responsible.
In her dissertation about the Schuldfrage, Barbro Eberan comes to some
conclusions that are irreconcilable with mine. According to her, it was above
all the rightists who cherished the Kollektivschuldthese, while the leftists
were critical. She makes her statement valid for all Western European
democracies.116 This paper has rejected any such generalizations. On the
contrary, Jorg Lindner’s work shows that the opposite must be true for
Sweden.
It has been asserted that a “dislike of everything German” was spread after
the war.117 This must be repudiated. As a matter of fact, nothing in the
examined sources can confirm this thesis. The conservative anti-Nazis could
continue to read Schiller at the same time as they took pity on the needy in
the devastated Hamburg.
According to a common view, the German cultural dominance in Sweden
was turned into an Anglo-Saxon ditto after the Second World War. On the
whole, this is a quite trivial statement, but nevertheless has the exact nature
of this change never been thoroughly described. However, this
characterization is probably more correct for the Swedish mentality on the
whole than for the conservative groups. For many humanistic educated
scholars and publishers, German was still the first foreign language, albeit
some of the leading social scientists – Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal
– gravitated towards the Untied States. Moreover, the general Swedish
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image of America was very positive until the beginning of the 1960s.118
In the light of the history of the Swedish-German relations, the early
post-war years must be seen as a new phase. Germany was interpreted
realisticly, as if it was a normal European nation but with an abnormal
history. The factual matters dominated the agenda. The German return to
the civilization was necessary and must be realized through industrial
restoration and civic education. Aversion neither to Germany nor to Germans
could be found. But the Nazis were seen as the embodiment of evil and
barbarism.
The break with the German tradition was perhaps not so complete, the
historian Nils Runeby has said. For example, many Swedish students
continued to travel to Germany after the war. “The conclusion is,” Runeby
writes, “that Germany's influence on a long view decreased, especially in the
cultural sector. But its position in science, technology, and business has
remained strong. The continuity is notable.”119 Nothing in this paper is
contradictory to his conclusion.
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